Author
Cletus C.N. Nwadiogbu, PhD
Commissioner of Police/Deputy Commandant
The Nigeria Police Academy, Wudil Kano
cletusnwadiogbu@gmail.com +2348036014140
Abstract
The deployment of non-state actors as auxiliary counterinsurgency forces has become a defining feature of
Nigeria’s security responses to Boko Haram terrorism in
the northeast, armed banditry in the northwest and
communal violence across the Middle Belt. Whilst such
arrangements offer short-term tactical advantages,
including enhanced local intelligence, terrain familiarity
and expanded force projection at reduced cost, they
generate profound structural risks that have received
insufficient theoretical and policy attention. This article
examines the dangers inherent in arming and utilising
non-state actors within the Nigerian counter-insurgency
framework, with particular reference to the Civilian Joint
Task Force, Operation Amotekun and Niger Delta armed
groups. Drawing on the structural violence framework
developed by Johan Galtung and the pro-government
militia literature anchored by Carey, Mitchell and Lowe,
the article argues that reliance on armed non-state actors
erodes state monopoly on violence, generates accountability deficits, accelerates small arms
proliferation, incentivises the militarisation of ethnic and
communal identities, and ultimately increases the longterm risk of civil war recurrence. Employing a
qualitative case study design supported by documentary
analysis, the article demonstrates that without robust
legal frameworks, accountability mechanisms, binding
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration protocols,
and Nigeria’s instrumentalisation of non-state armed
actors constitutes a structural danger that compounds the
very insecurities it was intended to resolve. The article
concludes by advancing reformed community security
architecture grounded in constitutional law, civilian
oversight and state capacity building.
References
Amnesty International (2015). Stars on their shoulders,
blood on their hands: War crimes committed by
the Nigerian military. Amnesty International.
Ashindorbe, K., Afatakpa, O. F., &Owonikoko, S. B.
(2021). Civilian Joint Task Force and Nigeria’s
counter-terrorism operation: A critique of the
community-based approach to insecurity. African
Security, 14(3), 286–305. https://doi.org/10.
1080/19392206.2021.1998977
Bates, R. H(2008). When things fell apart: State failure
in late-century Africa. Cambridge University
Press.
Bamidele, O(2016). Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF):
A community security option. Journal of
Deradicalization, 7, 124–144 .
Carey, S. C., Mitchell, N. J., & Lowe, W(2013). States,
the security sector, and the monopoly of
violence: A new database on pro-government militias. Journal of Peace Research, 50(2), 249
258 . https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343312464881
Carey, S. C., Colaresi, M. P., & Mitchell, N. J(2015).
Governments, informal links to militias, and
accountability. Journal of Conflict Resolution,
59(5), 850–876.https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027
14545892
Carey, S. C., Colaresi, M. P., & Mitchell, N. J(2016).
Risk mitigation, regime security, and militias:
Beyond coup-proofing. International Studies
Quarterly, 60(1), 59–72.
Centre for Civilians in Conflict(2018). Protecting and
harming civilians: Perceptions of the CJTF in
northeast Nigeria. CIVIC.
Democratic Socialist Movement(2020, January 23).
Amotekun. Socialist Party of Nigeria. Retrieved
from https://www.socialistnigeria.org
Ebo, A(2007). Non-state actors, peacebuilding and
security governance in West Africa. Journal of
Peacebuilding and Development, 3(2), 53–69.
Ebiede, T. M., & Langer, A(2017, March 9). How
amnesty efforts in the Niger Delta triggered new
violence. Relief Web. Retrieved from
https://reliefweb.int
Galtung, J(1969). Violence, peace, and peace research.
Journal of Peace Research, 6(3), 167–191.
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect(2026,
March 16). Nigeria. Retrieved from
https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/nigeria/
Global Voices(2020, January 24). A regional security
intervention in Nigeria sparks ethnic, political
tensions. Retrieved from https://globalvoices.org Guardian Nigeria (2024, March 11). Interrogating
Southwest’s continuous battle with insecurity
four years after Amotekun’s birth. Retrieved from
https://guardian.ng
Irregular Warfare Insider(2025, January 10). The peril
of ignoring the legitimacy of violent non-state
actors.Retrieved from https://irregularwarfare.org
Mitchell, N. J., Carey, S. C., & Butler, C(2014). The
impact of pro-government militias on human
rights violations. International Interactions,
40(5), 812–836.
Ndidigwe, D. C(2021). The state and the emergence of
violent non-state actors in Nigeria. International
Journal of Management, Social Sciences, Peace
and Conflict Studies, 4(4), 53–67.
Nwoko, K. C(2022). Amotekun: The southwest region’s
response to the failures of the Nigerian police and
worsening insecurity in Nigeria. African
Identities, 22(1), 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/14
725843.2021.1994368
Ogbozor, E(2016). Understanding the informal security
sector in Nigeria (Special Report 391). United
States Institute of Peace.
Okoli, A. C(2021). Military, arms monopoly and
proliferation of small arms and light weapons in
Africa. In B. Ugwueze & F. Onuoha (Eds.),
Security governance in Africa. Springer.
Onuoha, F. C(2017). Introduction. In C. M. A. Kwaja,
K. Okenyodo, & V. Ahmadu-Haruna (Eds.), Non
state security actors and security provisioning in
Nigeria. Rule of Law and Empowerment
Initiative.